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The Determinants of Corporate Bank Borrowing
Abstract
In this study we examine the determinants of the fraction of bank borrowing to total borrowing
in 749 4-digit SIC industries between 1982 and 1987. To our surprise, we do not find strong
support for the view that banks provide loans to firms where problems of monitoring and
verification of project quality between insiders and outsiders are greatest. We find some support
for this monitoring view role of banks among larger borrowers with more than $1 million in
assets. Consistent with Rajan' s (1992) theory that firms with good growth opportunities use bank
debt less and instead opt for arms-length debt, we find that larger firms which can most readily
access arms-length debt do so when they are in industries which are viewed positively by the
stock market. Also consistent with the idea that banks build relationships with firms only when
they can be assured that such relationships are largely exclusive, we find that bank borrowing
is greatest among firms with relatively little debt in their capital structures.

The Determinants of Corporate Bank Borrowing
While banks have long been a major source of capital for U.S. businesses, the factors which lead
businesses to borrow from banks instead of the public bond market, private lenders or trade
creditors are poorly understood. This issue is becoming increasingly important as banks lose
market share to other providers of capita1. 1 Economic theory suggests that banks have a
comparative advantage as providers of capital because of their special knowledge of customers
and ability to closely monitor users of funds on an ongoing basis [See Fama (1985)]. It may be
that banks are losing market share because they have not pursued their comparative advantage
in monitoring and building relationships or because these services are not sufficiently valuable
in the marketplace.
It is important that we better understand the comparative advantage of banks in the

lending arena. In the last several years, key policymakers have advocated making it easier for
banks to provide loans under the logic that they form special relationships with businesses.
These efforts have been particularly directed at encouraging banks to provide credit to small
businesses. President Clinton, for example, has encouraged bank regulators to view noncollateralized, "character" loans in a positive light. But, if banks serve no special role as providers
of capital then such efforts might be better directed elsewhere.
The view that banks play a special role in the economy because of their superior
information about borrowers has been made in models developed by several authors including
Diamond (1984). The argument is that financial intermediaries have a comparative advantage
in lending to firms which are difficult for outsiders to evaluate and monitor. Such firms are
likely to have unique intangible resources and be relatively small. Alternatively, banks may

1Becketti and Morris (1992) show that bank loans as a fraction of all debt in the economy
has been declining in the last decade.
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which have intangible resources because moral hazard problems

in lending require that assets be collateralizable [Boot, Thakor and Udell (1991)]. This perspective
clearly offers different predictions than the unique resources theory.
This study empirically evaluates the relative importance. of various theories of the
determinants of bank lending behavior. Our empirical analysis is restricted by the paucity of
finn-level data on bank borrowing of U.S. firms in electronically readable fonn. Consequently,
we resort to size-stratified, industry-level data provided by Dun and Bradstreet. This dataset
aggregates information on the borrowing behavior of more than 1,000,000 businesses each year.
Our main results show that the determinants of bank borrowing depend critically on finn
size. Among very small firms with assets of less than $500,000, banks largely provide credit to
businesses with collateralizable assets. This does not fit the theory that banks have an advantage
in lending to firms with intangible resources which are hard to observe at arms-length. Rather,
it appears that banks screen smaller lenders and choose to lend almost exclusively to those with
collateralizable assets. However, among larger firms this behavior is reversed. Banks concentrate
lending to businesses with the most intangible resources. They lend relatively more to businesses
which have unique assets and less tangible assets on their balance sheet. This change in
borrower characteristics across firm size suggests that borrowing opportunities differ
dramatically as firms grow. One model which predicts a pattern like this one is Diamond (1991).
Diamond shows that good borrowers use public credit markets because they have strong
reputations; that medium-quality borrowers resort to bank borrowing; while low-quality
borrowers are sometimes denied even bank credit. This model can explain our results if size is
a reasonable proxy for firm's quality and reputation in the marketplace.
The results obtained in this paper reinforce and expand the findings of an older literature
which examines the stock market reaction to firms' announcements of new and renewed bank
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loans. Mikkelson and Partch (1986), James (1987), Lummer and McConnell (1989), Wansley,
Elayan and Collins (1991), and Slovin, Johnson and Glascock (1992) show that bank loan
announcements can have positive effects on firm value. These studies are consistent with the
hypothesis that banks provide special information production services to borrowers. At the same
time, these results can be rationalized by other stories about the role that banks play as lenders.
For example, the story that banks mainly play a screening role rather than a monitoring role
would be consistent with the event study evidence. In addition, while these studies suggest that
banks provide special monitoring services to borrowers which causes share prices to rise, they
give little information about the types of firms which will benefit the most from bank's services.
For example, it is not possible to analyze the effect of decisions not to obtain bank loans (or,
alternatively, denial of credit) on firm value. Thus, our analysis of the determinants of bank
borrowing behavior adds substantially to this empirical literature on the special role of banks
as providers of capital. 2
This paper is organized as follows. Section I develops the hypotheses to be tested. We
contrast the unique resources view of lending to the asset based lending view. In Section TI we
present the dataset used in the empirical section and offer descriptive statistics about the
industries in the sample. Section III presents our main results which show the dependence of
bank borrowing on industry characteristics. Section IV concludes the paper and attempts to
reconcile the results with previous theory in this area.
2Two previous studies also analyze the determinants of bank
borrowing. Hoshi, Kashyap
and Scharstein (1993) analyze the determinants of the bank debt/total debt ratio of 112
publicly traded Japanese firms. They find that financial leverage (debt/assets) is positively
related to the propensity to use bank debt while liquidity is negatively associated with the
likelihood of using bank debt. Easterwood and Kadapakkam (1991) finds that the proportion
of non-public long-term debt held by Fortune 500 firms cannot be accounted for by proxies
for issue costs, agency costs and the value of liquidity. As we will discuss later, there are not
well-established reasons why a very large firm such as those examined by these authors
would borrow much from a bank in the first place.
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The Role of Bank Lending in the Economy

A.

Information Asymmetry and Bank Lending

4

A rich literature describes the comparative advantage of financial intermediaries as providers
ofcapital. Diamond (1984), Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), Fama (1985), Boyd and Prescott
(1986) and Seward (1990) show that banks can bring welfare improvements in an economy with
informational asymmetries between borrowers and lenders that cannot be resolved by third
parties. Banks have an informational advantage relative to other providers of capital because
they can better observe firms' cash flows and project choices. Thus provision of bank loans
certifies firm quality to a market lacking in information. This information asymmetry perspective
on the role of banks leads to the first empirical hypothesis tested in this paper, namely that firms
with activities which are more difficult to observe will be the most likely users of bank debt.
Empirically, we measure observability of activities as the fractio11 of fixed assets to total assets. Firms
with more fixed assets will tend to have activities which are more easily observable by outsiders.
For example, it would be much easier to check that a firm builds a new factory with a loan than
to check that it provides needed training to its workers (purchases an intangible asset) with the
same loan.
Another measure of the unobservability of project choice is firm size. Firms which are
small are typically more difficult for arms-length outsiders to observe because little information
is produced about these firms. A bank, however, will typically have access to the management
and premises of borrowers, regardless of their size. (See Fama (1985) and Slovin, Johnson and
Glascock (1992)).
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Information Asymmetry When Firms Can Build Reputations

Diamond (1991) has shown that information asymmetry may lead to a more complex equilibrium
when firms can build reputations in the credit market. In his model, the form of debt financing
depends on information asymmetries between the lender and borrower. Both the degree of
monitoring required for the project being funded and the riskiness of the project influence a
firm's form of financing. Diamond relates the choice of debt instrument to these two factors in
a multi-period model in which a borrower establishes a reputation. A borrower with a high
credit rating chooses to borrow directly by issuing publicly-traded bonds or commercial paper
because its reputation is well-established in the credit market. A borrower with an intermediate
credit rating chooses to borrow from a bank to obtain monitoring services. Finally, a borrower
with a low credit rating chooses a bank loan also but will be screened and may be rejected for
the loan. If business prospects worsen, a higher-rated borrower will choose a bank loan instead
of commercial paper, which could lead to an increase in the ratio of new loans to new
commercial paper issues.
Diamond's model suggests that the relation between information asymmetry and the
concentration of bank borrowing will depend on firm size. At the high end of the market, firms
build strong reputations which allow them to tap cheap credit in external credit markets. Thus,
they have little bank debt. Likewise, at the low end of the market, many firms are screened out
of the capital markets by banks. These firms have little choice but to use self-financing, financing
by "angels" or financing from suppliers and thus will have little bank debt. On the other hand,
in the middle part of the market, firms which lack sufficient reputation to use the external credit
market, but have demonstrably low credit risk for a bank, will use banks as a source of capital.
Diamond's model has the empirical implication that the determinants of bank borrowing are size
dependent. Specifically, firms which are more difficult to monitor will be more likely to be
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denied credit when they are small. However, as they grow sufficiently in size to be able to access
external credit markets, they will be more likely to borrow from banks when outsiders can't
easily verify their quality. Thus, we hypothesize that firms with high concentrations of intangible
assets will have low bank loan intensity when they are small, but high bank loan intensity as ·
they grow in size. And when they become very large and well-known in the external credit
market, they will have little bank debt at all.
Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1993) present a model which leads to implications very
similar to those of Diamond (1991) when managers maximize shareholder value. They predict
that firms will use arms-length debt rather than bank debt when they have good investment
opportunities because there is no need for bank monitoring to prevent poor project choice.
Consistent with this prediction, they find that Japanese firms which use the most arms-length
debt have less leverage and greater liquidity. Surprisingly though, they do not find that firms
with higher Tobin's q have less bank debt. They show that this is theoretically possible given that
manager incentives to invest in good projects vary as q changes. Given that most of the small
firms that we analyze in this study have high if not total manager ownership, the relevant case
of their model is that where managers choose value-maximizing projects. Their model then leads
to the additional empirical implication that firms with low leverage should be the least likely to
rely on bank borrowing-at least when arms length debt markets are accessible.

C.

Bank Oversight and Managerial Discretion

In a recent paper, Rajan (1992) has expanded

t~e

literature by explaining why some firms would

find bank loans disadvantageous despite banks' ability to more closely monitor actions and
performance. Banks gain specific information about borrower performance which cannot be
transferred. This allows the firm to gain access to loans and gives the bank a measure of
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monopoly power over the firm which allows it to gain rents in compensation for its efforts. A
firm with projects involving low discretionary investment chooses bank loans because the
different incentives from different debt instruments have little impact on project performance.
If the level of discretionary investment is high,

~

firm may instead choose bond financing to

avoid the costs arising from bank loans due to the rental rights that the bank gets.
Rajan's (1992) theory leads to some predictions opposite those of the earlier theory that
banks provide the most capital in industries where close monitoring is needed because of
informational asymmetries. Specifically, managerial discretion is likely to be most important in
industries which are intangible resource intensive. Tangible resources require less ongoing
management effort than intangible resources. Firms producing ideas (e.g. advertising agencies)
or services need careful and continuous management supervision. Empirically then, we
hypothesize that firms which are in industries with significant tangible resources will use
relatively more bank debt than will firms in industries with significant intangible resources.
Because discretionary investment in projects is important in research and development, we also
hypothesize that firms with higher R&D expenditures will be less likely to use bank debt.
Finally, firms with good future opportunities are more likely to break away from banks
to use external credit markets. This avoids some of the onerous effects of bank monitoring
discussed by Rajan (1992). Like Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1993), Rajan (1991) predicts that
Tobin's q (a measure of future growth opportunities) should be inversely related to the use of
bank debt over some region.

D.

Bank Lending and Collateral

In contrast to the information asymmetry view, the model of Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991) also
shows that banks may not lend to firms with intangible assets. Tangible assets help a firm to
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obtain bank loans because they serve as collateral. Collateral limits the moral hazard problem
arising in bank lending when borrowers take unobservable actions after a loan is made which
are not in the lender's interest. Collateral induces a borrower to choose the first-best action,
because the probability of default and loss of the collateral decreases with the first-best action.
Riskier borrowers pledge more collateral for their loans than do less risky borrowers because
riskier borrowers have a greater incentive to choose a second-best action if they do not have
collateral at stake. If private information on a loan's payoff, available to the borrower but not the
lender also exists, then the use of collateral increases. The positive relationship between borrower
riskiness and the use of collateral will depend on the extent of private information.
The theory of Boot, Thakor, and Udell suggests that the relationship between the
concentration of bank debt and tangible assets, or potential collateral will be positive. A firm
with collateral is more likely to obtain bank debt because it can pledge the collateral to avoid
moral hazard problems with a bank loan. The collateral theory has predictions for this variable
that are the opposite of the information asymmetry theory. Empirically, the information
asymmetries theory predicts a negative relationship between tangible assets and bank debt, but
the collateral theory predicts a positive relationship between tangible assets and bank debt. The
collateral theory also suggests that riskier borrowers will be more likely to use collateral than
less-risky borrowers. But because the presence of private information may either increase or
diminish this relationship, the empirical implications are indistinct. To the extent that the
collateral theory predicts a positive relationship between risk and collateral, and risk is
negatively correlated with firm size, then empirically we would expect to see smaller borrowers
using more collateral and more bank debt than larger borrowers.3
3This

prediction, too, differs from the information asymmetry theory, which would
predict that small firms use little bank debt, while medium-sized firms use more bank debt if
they have few collaterizable assets.
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Summary of Hypotheses

The above hypotheses offer competing empirical predictions about banks' comparative advantage
in providing loans. In each model, the observability of a project is an important determinant of
corporate bank borrowing. However, observability, measured by the proportion of fixed assets,
is negatively related to bank debt in the information asymmetry theory, but positively related
to bank debt in both the collateral theory and the bank oversight theory. Diamond's (1991)
reputational-effects model predicts a more complex relationship, in which the empirical relation
between observability and bank debt depends on firm size. Small firms which are difficult to
monitor (have relatively greater intangible assets) will more likely be denied bank debt, while
medium-sized firms will be more likely to obtain bank debt if they are difficult to monitor.
Eventually, as a firm becomes large and establishes a reputation, it will rely more on public debt
markets and less on bank debt.
Rajan's (1992) bank oversight theory suggests a number of other variables that will
influence corporate bank borrowing. Firms with projects requiring a high level of discretionary
investment and firms with good future opportunities avoid the costs of monitoring associated
with bank loans by going to external debt markets. Empirically, we expect discretionary
investment, measured by the ratio of R&D to firm sales, and future growth opportunities,
measured by Tobin's q, to be negatively related to the intensity of borrowing from banks. A
firm's leverage ratio also will help to determine corporate bank borrowing because a higher ratio
likely reflects a higher number of sources of credit for the firm. The oversight theory suggests
that banks tend to lend to firms when they can develop monopoly information rights related to
that firm, so firms with higher leverage ratios and

a greater number of sources of credit would

be less likely to hold bank debt. Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1993) make a similar prediction
using different logic.
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Empirical Approach

A.

Data
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We measure bank borrowing behavior and financial characteristics using industry-level summary
information from 1982-1987 distributed by Dun and Bradstreet in their InSight Database. This
data is partially listed in the widely used Dun and Bradstreet Key Business Ratios publication. We
use 4-digit SIC level medians of balance sheet and income statement items provided by Dun and
Bradstreet. These data summarize the financial condition of more than 1,000,000 proprietorships,
partnerships and corporations in the United States. this data source is ideal for analyzing the
relevance of informational and co)]ateral issues in obtaining capital because the firms included
in the Dun and Bradstreet database are typicaJly sma)] and privately held.

B.

Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 shows the number of 4-digit SIC industries in the sample by size grouping and year.
Dun and Bradstreetdoes not summarize data for some size classes when insufficient firms with
data are available. Thus, we have more industries stratified at the $100,000 to $1 million level
than at the less than $100,000 level. Likewise, the number of industries with firms with assets
exceeding $1 million was smaner than the number where assets were between $100,000 and $1
million (586 vs. 883) in 1982. Table 1 shows that the number of industries covered in our sample
rose slightly over time-especially in 1985.
Table 2 gives descriptive statistics for the variables used in our regression analyses. There
is considerable cross-sectional variation in our measure of leverage (debt/assets) and our
measure of bank borrowing intensity (bank debt/total liabilities). The median amount of bank
debt relative to all. liabilities in our sample was 10.2%. This indicates that the firms included in
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the industry-level data generally tend to rely on non-bank sources of capital such as trade credit.

III.

Results

We regress the fraction of bank debt to total liabilities on financial characteristics which relate
to theories of bank borrowing. Because our data are in panel form for the 1982-87 period we use
a fixed effects model with industry and year effects to minimize bias from omitted variables and
sectoral changes in borrowing behavior. In addition, because some of the theories tested in this
study condition their predictions based on firm size we estimate our regression model by size
grouping of firms. Specifically, we present regressions for very small firms with less than
$100,000 in assets; small firms with $100,000 to $1,000,000 in assets; and medium-sized firms with
$1,000,000 - $5,000,000 in assets. Because Dun and Bradstreet provides very few financial
breakdowns for firms with more than $5,000,000 in assets we exclude these larger firms from our
analysis.

A.

Results for All Firms
Table 3 shows the results of our regressions. The first column gives the results based on

aggregated, industry-level data for all firms in the D&B database, regardless of firm size. The
coefficient on the debt/assets ratio is negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
This indicates that bank lending is concentrated in firms with less total debt than other firms.
This finding is consistent with the prediction of Rajan (1992) that banks tend to lend to firms
where they can serve as monopsonistic providers of capital. When a firm borrows relatively
heavily, it is less likely that banks will be primary providers of credit. This finding also differs
from that of Hoshi, Kashyap and Sharfstein (1991) for Japanese firms. The different institutional
circumstances and size of firms in their study and ours may account for the disparity in results.
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The coefficient on the fraction of fixed assets is positive and statistically significant
(t=2.09). This indicates that bank lending is concentrated in firms with heavy amounts of
collateralizable assets. This finding is not consistent with the theory that banks primarily lend
to firms with intangible, hard-to-observe assets. A pure asymmetric information story of bank
lending thus appears difficult to uphold empirically. This conclusion is consistent with results
of Berger and Udell (1990) that over two-thirds of all commercial bank loans are backed by
collateral.
The coefficients for R&D/sales are not statistically significant. This again suggests that
banks do not concentrate their lending among firms with relatively unique, hard-to-monitor and
observe assets. The coefficient on Tobin's q is statistically but is not economically significant in
the first regression equation. This is consistent with Rajan's (1991) prediction that bank debt is
costliest for firms with good investment opportunities which require exercise of management
discretion. This suggests that firms with good investment opportunities are able to obtain capital
elsewhere.

B.

Size-stratified Results
The second, third and fourth regression equations give results for subsamples based on

firm size. In the second regression equation, we examine the determinants of bank lending
intensity to firms which are very small (assets of $100,000 or less). These firms are likely to be
run by a single owner-manager and thus have severe informational asymmetry problems.4 In the
third regression we examine the determinants of bank lending among firms with assets in the
$100,000 to $1,000,000 range. Such firms are still likely to have a single owner-manager. But they

The quality of financial statements for these smaller firms may be particularly low. Such
small firms also have the greatest risk of going out of business.
4
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are also likely to be more seasoned and have more long-lived relationships with providers of
capital. Finally, in the fourth regression equation we analyze bank lending to firms with $1
million to $5 million in assets. While these firms are small by the standard of public equity
markets, they are large enough to be able to obtain capital through non-banks such as insurance
companies, venture capitalists, etc. The adjusted R2's for the regressions shown in Table 3 lie
between 0.3 and 0.1, indicating that much but not the majority of inter-industry variation in bank
loan intensity is explained by the regressors employed and year dummies (not shown).
Among very small firms (those with less than $100,000 in assets), we find a large negative
coefficient on the debt/assets ratio (-0.38). This indicates that for every ten percent increase in
the average firm's debt/asset ratio, there will be roughly a four percent reduction in the amount
of bank debt relative to liabilities. Banks appear to be quite reluctant to lend to very small firms
with access to other sources of capital. These very small firms are likely to be in the early stages
of establishing a relationship with a bank that will hesitate to make the required informational
investments in a borrower over which it does not have monopsony power as a supplier of
capital. Firms with $100,000 to $1 million in assets and those with $1 million to $5 million in
assets differ in that the trade-off in accessing bank capital with a high debt/assets ratio is lower.
The coefficients on the debt/assets ratio in the third and fourth regression equations are -.12 and
.03, respectively. The positive, although statistically insignificant, coefficient on the debt/assets
ratio in the largest size subgroup supports the idea mentioned above that the difference in the
results obtained in this study and Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1993) may be due to the
difference in size of firms examined. Specifically, their study and ours find the same positive
sign on financial leverage among larger firms which can access public debt markets.
The importance of collateralizable assets in obtaining bank loans falls as firms become
larger. The coefficient on the fraction of fixed assets for firms with less than $100,000 in assets
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is economically and statistically significant (coefficient= 0.23, t-statistic = 5.61). This coefficient
declines with size and actually becomes negative for firms with more than $1 million in assets.
This suggests that the smallest firms in the economy tend to be screened out of the credit market
altogether unless they can get a collateralized loan. Once businesses are large enough to access
other sources of capital, bank lending tends to become concentrated among firms lacking
collaterizable assets. These relatively large businesses are likely to have sufficiently long financial
histories to justify a non-collateralized bank loan. At the same time, larger businesses with
collateralizable assets may be able to get arms-length loans from finance companies or private
placements.
We do not find that the ratio of R&D I sales is related to the concentration of bank loans.
On the other hand, industry growth potential, measured by Tobin's q (the imputed market value
of assets over the book value of assets), is positively related to the concentration of bank lending
among very small firrns and negatively related to the proportion of bank lending among larger
firms with more than $1 million in assets. This indicates that smaller firms in industries with
good future prospects are more likely to get a bank loan. On the other hand, larger firms with
good future prospects appear more likely to resort to other sources of capital when they have
good prospects. This is consistent with Rajan's (1992) prediction that bank loans are onerous for
firms with good prospects that require managerial discretion. The dependence of the q effect on
size again is likely to reflect the effect of screening among small firms. Very small firms appear
to have little alternative but to take a bank loan when they have good future prospects. In
contrast, larger firms have access to other sources of capital which they appear to use in order
to avoid the disincentive effects of bank loans on managerial discretion.
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Conclusion

In this study · we have examined the determinants of firm's use of bank debt to fund their
operations. While the existing event study literature suggests that banks play a unique role as
providers of capital, little is known about the types of firms which use bank debt the most. To
our surprise, we do not find strong support for the predominant view that banks provide loans
to firms where problems of monitoring and verification of project quality between insiders and
outsiders are greatest. Proxies for the need for bank monitoring (levels of intangible assets and
research & development spending/sales) are not consistently related to bankdebt concentration
as suggested by the theory. We find the strongest support for the special monitoring role of
banks among larger firms with more than $1 million in assets. Bank debt as a percentage of all
liabilities is somewhat greater for these larger firms with with a high proportion on noncollateralizable intangible assets.
Our results suggest that a more developed view of the costs and benefits of bank
financing is needed. One such view, offered by Rajan (1992), argues that banks can overcome
informational problems by building relationships with firms, but that these same relationships
may become onerous and prevent managers from pursuing growth opportunities. Consistent
with the idea that firms with strong growth opportunities use bank debt less and opt for armslength debt, we find that larger firms which can most readily access arms-length debt do so
when they are in industries which are viewed positively by the stock market (where Tobin's q
is high). Also consistent with the idea that banks build relationships with firms only when they
can be assured that such relationships are largely exclusive, we find that bank borrowing is
greatest among firms with relatively little debt in their capital structures. Banks lend far less to
firms which are heavily indebted, especially when they are small. This finding buttresses similar
empirical conclusions about the importance of exclusivity in lending relationships for the
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relaxation of credit constraints obtained by Berger and Udell (1993) and Petersen and Rajan .
(1993).
While this study sheds light on some existing theories of bank borrowing, the findings
and our interpretations are subject to several important caveats. First, the proxies used for
information asymmetry and asset collateralizability are crude and incomplete. We are also unable
to directly observe some critical factors in borrowing from a bank such as the nature of firm's
alternative sources of capital and the length of their relationships with banks. In addition, we
do not know how many banks a firm borrows from. Some of these factors are more clearly
explored in Petersen and Rajan (1992). Second, our empirical model does not fully operationalize
concepts in the theoretical literature such as the idea of a firm's credit rating and past reputation
as a borrower. Third, our analysis is carried out using industry-level rather than firm-level data.
This inevitably causes loss of information which might better help us account for the crosssectional variation in bank borrowing. We hope that some of these shortcomings can be
addressed in future research in this area.
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TABLE 1

Numer of Industries in the Sample by Year and Size Grouping.

Year

Assets < $5 million

Assets< $100,000

Assets> $100,000
& < $1 million

~

> $1 million

& < $5 million

1982

749

427

883

586

1983

750

424

883

596

1984

756

431

889

606

1985

760

397

915

639

1986

761

396

918

645

1987

760

395

916

642
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TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics for Main Variables Analyzed in Regressions. The sample
consists of 749 4-digit SIC industries. Reported values are based on industry
medians reported by Dun & Bradstreet without firm size stratification.
Variable

25th percentile

Median

75th percentile

5.1%

10.2%

18.2%

Debt/ total assets

20.6%

26.9%

35.2%

Fixed assets/total assets

23.5%

29.5%

35.7%

0.78

0.91

1.11

0.3%

1.5%

Bank loans/liabilities

Tobin's q
R&D spending/sales

< 0.1%

Sales

$504,481

$1,000,000

$1,953,049
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TABLE 3
Panel Regressions with Industry and Year Effects Predicting the Fraction of Bank
Debt to Total Liabilities Among Size Groupings of Firms With Less Than
$5,000,000 in Assets in the 1982-87 Period.
The table reports estimates of a fixed effects model with industry and year dummies. The unit of analysis
is the median of a firm characteristic at the 4-digit SIC level computed by Dun and Bradstreet. The fraction
of fixed assets is computed as plant, property and equipment divided by total assets. The debt/assets ratio
is computed as total liabilities minus net worth divided by total assets. The R&D/sales ratio is the mean
R&D/sales ratio for publicly held firms in the COMPUSTAT tape. The Tobin's q ratio is the median ratio
of the market value of common equity plus the book value of debt divided by total assets of firms in the
same industry on the COMPUSTAT tape. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. • means the coefficient
is significantly different from zero at the 5% level or better.

Assets < $5 million

Assets< $100,000

Assets> $100;000
& < $1 million

~

> $1 million
& < $5 million

Intercept

-.027
(-5.29)*

-.049
(-3.56)*

-.076
(-13.9)*

.087
(11.5)•

Debt I assets

-.067
(-6.85)*

-.379
(-1 0.7)*

-.123
(-9.79)*

-.030
(-2.54)*

Fraction of
fixed assets

.035
(2.09)*

.232
(5.61)*

.197
(10.2)*

-.279
(-10.9)*

R&D/sales

.0048
(0.22)

-.011
(-0.21)

.020
(0.89)

-.037
(-1.18)

Tobin's q

-.0062
(-1.96)*

.019
(2.02)*

.0025
(0.66)

-.018
(-3.66)*

Adjusted R2

0.23

0.26

0.17

0.15

Total observations

4535

2469

5404

3488
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